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In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowl-
edge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial
systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense cat-
egorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic cate-
gorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according
to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a
representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual structures rep-
resented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a
task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense
linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies,
and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that
our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual ca-
pabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly
applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the sys-
tem, in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested
into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions
on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed
us to extend our previous evaluation.
Keywords: Knowledge Representation, Categorization, Conceptual Spaces, Cognitive
Architectures, Heterogeneous Proxytypes, ACT-R, Prototypes, Exemplars, Common-sense
Reasoning, CLARION.
1. Introduction
In this work we present the extended version of an integrated knowledge representation
system aimed at performing conceptual categorization tasks. It is named Dual-PECCS
(after Prototypes and Exemplars-based Conceptual Categorization System), since it relies
on two different sorts of cognitively-inspired common-sense categorization: prototypical
and exemplars-based categorization. In addition, it is grounded on the theoretical tenets
coming from the dual process theory of mind, and on the hypothesis of “heterogeneous
proxytypes” developed in the area of the biologically inspired cognitive architectures
(BICA).
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The system aims at providing a unified framework for the conceptual categorization
simulating some of the common-sense heuristic strategies exploited by humans in cat-
egorization tasks. More specifically, it integrates strategies based on prototypes and
exemplars-based reasoning, as suggested by the psychological results coming form the
area of experimental Cognitive Science. The current version of Dual-PECCS has been
integrated and tested in the ACT-R and CLARION cognitive architectures to investi-
gate its compatibility with the models of cognition therein implemented (Anderson et al.,
2004; Langley et al., 2009; Sun, 2006).1
While existing systems and architectures allow to selectively perform either prototype
or exemplar-based categorization rather than autonomously adapting their strategy to
the input being categorized (Anderson and Betz, 2001), conversely, Dual-PECCS ad-
dresses this issue. In addition to the deployment of such common-sense categorization
strategies, Dual-PECCS also provides an integration of such types of non-monotonic
reasoning with the classical categorization based on standard, deductive, processes. The
flow and the interaction of such diverse reasoning mechanisms have been devised based
on the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning, and compared to the
answers provided by human subjects. In this respect, the main goal of the current system
is proposing a cognitively-inspired framework for conceptual representation and catego-
rization. Nonetheless, some preliminary results (see (Lieto et al., 2015a)) show that the
resulting system also provides advances in performing common-sense categorization of
linguistic descriptions compared with state-of-the-art question-answering systems (in-
cluding Bing, Google and Wolfram-Alpha). However, a deeper cross-systems comparison
is out of the scope of our present contribution, and is ongoing work.
This work is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the theoretical bases
inspiring our system, coming from the research in Cognitive Science. In Section 3 we
start by outlining the overall architecture and describe the heterogeneous Knowledge
Base adopted (Section 3.1), we then illustrate the pipeline going all throughout from the
input textual description to the category in output (Section 3.2) and provide the detailed
algorithms devised to implement the categorization task (Section 3.3). In Section 4 we
show how the hybrid system for the conceptual categorization was integrated into ACT-
R and CLARION, and in Section 5 we describe the evaluation of the resulting system,
by introducing the experimental setting adopted and discussing the obtained results.
Finally, we elaborate on future work.
2. Prototypes, Exemplars and Proxytypes
In Cognitive Science different theories about the nature of concepts have been proposed.
According to the traditional view, known as “classical” or Aristotelian theory, concepts
can be simply defined in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Such theory
was dominant until the mid ’70s of the last Century, when Rosch’s experimental results
demonstrated the inadequacy of such a theory for ordinary –or common-sense– con-
cepts (Rosch, 1975). Rosch’s results seemed to suggest, on the other hand, that ordinary
concepts are characterized and organized in our mind in terms of prototypes. Since then,
different theories of concepts have been proposed to explain different representational
and reasoning aspects concerning the problem of typicality: we focus here on the proto-
1The previous version of the system was integrated only into ACT-R (Lieto et al., 2015c). Thanks to this additional
integration, the current evaluation has been performed on both cognitive architectures and tested on a larger
dataset.
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type theory and on the exemplars theory.2 According to the prototype view, knowledge
about categories is stored in terms of prototypes, i.e., in terms of some representation
of the “best” instance of the category. In this view, the concept bird should coincide
with a representation of a typical bird (e.g., a robin). In the simpler versions of this
approach, prototypes are represented as (possibly weighted) lists of typical features. Ac-
cording to the exemplar view, a given category is mentally represented as set of specific
exemplars explicitly stored in memory: the mental representation of the concept bird is a
set containing the representation of (some of) the birds we encountered during our past
experience.
Although these approaches have been largely considered as competing ones (since they
propose different models and predictions about how we organize and reason on concep-
tual information), they turned out to be not mutually exclusive (Malt, 1989). Rather,
they seem to succeed in explaining different classes of cognitive phenomena, such as the
fact that human subjects use different representations to categorize concepts: some use
exemplars, a few rely on prototypes, and often both exemplars and prototypes are em-
ployed (Smith and Minda, 1998). This distinction also has neural plausibility, as witnessed
by empirical research (Squire and Knowlton, 1995). Such experimental evidences led to
the development of the so called “heterogeneous hypothesis” about the nature of con-
cepts: this approach assumes that concepts do not constitute a unitary phenomenon, and
hypothesizes that different types of conceptual representations may co-exist: prototypes,
exemplars, classical representations, and so on (Machery, 2009). All such representa-
tions, in this view, constitute different bodies of knowledge and contain different types
of information associated to the the same conceptual entity. Furthermore, each body
of conceptual knowledge is featured by specific processes in which such representations
are involved (e.g., in cognitive tasks like recognition, learning, categorization, etc.). In
particular prototypes and exemplars-based representations are associated with the possi-
bility of dealing with non-monotonic strategies of reasoning and categorization, while the
classical representations (i.e. that ones based on necessary and/or sufficient conditions)
are associated with standard deductive mechanism of reasoning.3
In recent years an alternative theory of concepts has been proposed: the proxytype the-
ory. It postulates a biological localization and interaction between different brain areas
for dealing with conceptual structures, that have a direct counterpart in the distinction
between long term and working memory (Prinz, 2002). Such characterization is partic-
2In Cognitive Science there is another well known typicality-based theory of concepts, called the theory-theory.
Such approach adopts some form of holistic point of view about concepts. According to some versions of the
theory-theories, concepts are analogous to theoretical terms in a scientific theory. For example, the concept cat
is individuated by the role it plays in our mental theory of zoology. In other versions of the approach, concepts
themselves are identified with micro-theories of some sort. For example, the concept cat should be identified with
a mentally represented microtheory about cats. In the current contribution we do not take into consideration the
theory-theory approach, since it is, to a certain extent, more vaguely defined when compared to both prototypes
and exemplar based approaches. As a consequence, at present its computational treatment seems to be more
problematic. Full-detailed reviews can be found in (Machery, 2009; Murphy, 2002).
3Let us assume that we have to categorize a stimulus with the following features: “it has fur, woofs and wags its
tail”. In this case, the result of a prototype-based categorization would be dog, since these cues are associated to the
prototype of dog. Prototype-based reasoning, however, is not the only type of reasoning based on typicality. In fact,
if an exemplar corresponding to the stimulus being categorized is available, too, it is acknowledged that humans
use to classify it by evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t. the prototype associated to the
underlying concepts (Frixione and Lieto, 2013). For example, a penguin is rather dissimilar from the prototype of
bird. However, if we already know an exemplar of penguin, and if we know that it is an instance of bird, it is easier
to classify a new penguin as a bird w.r.t. a categorization process based on the similarity with the prototype of
that category. This type of common-sense categorization is known in literature as exemplars-based categorization.
Finally, an example of standard deductive categorization is the categorization as triangle of a stimulus described
by the following features: “it is a polygon, it has three corners and three sides”.
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ularly interesting for the explanation of phenomena such as, for example, the activation
(and the retrieval) of conceptual information. In this setting, concepts are seen as prox-
ytypes.
Definition 1 (Proxytypes): A proxytype is any element of a complex representational
network stored in long-term memory corresponding to a particular category that can be
tokenized in working memory to ‘go proxy’ for that category (Prinz, 2002).
In other terms, the proxytype theory, inspired by the work of Barsalou (Barsalou, 1999),
considers concepts as temporary constructs of a given category, activated (tokenized) in
working memory as a result of conceptual processing activities, such as concept identifi-
cation, recognition and retrieval.
In its original formulation, however, proxytypes are depicted as monolithic conceptual
structures, primarily intended as prototypes (Prinz, 2002). A revised view of this ap-
proach has been recently proposed in the area of BICA, hypothesizing the availability of
a wider range of representation types than just prototypes (Lieto, 2014). They correspond
to the kinds of representations hypothesized by the above mentioned heterogeneous ap-
proach to concepts. In this sense, proxytypes are assumed to be heterogeneous in nature
(i.e., they are composed by heterogeneous networks of conceptual representations and
not only by a monolithic one).
Definition 2 (Heterogeneous Proxytypes): Heterogeneous representations (such as pro-
totypes, exemplars, etc.) for each conceptual category are stored in long-term memory.
They can be activated and accessed by resorting to different categorization strategies. In
this view, each representation has its associated accessing procedures.
In the design of our system we followed the approach based on heterogeneous proxytypes4
for both the representational level (that is, we devised a hybrid knowledge base composed
of heterogeneous representations, each endowed with specific reasoning mechanisms) and
for the ‘proxyfication’ (that is, the set of procedures implementing the tokenization of
the different representations in working memory).
3. Dual Process Architecture for Conceptual Representation and
Processing
As earlier mentioned, the Dual-PECCS relies –at the representational level– on the
heterogeneous proxytypes approach, and it is also inspired by the dual process theory
of reasoning and rationality. More in detail, Dual-PECCS is equipped with a hybrid
knowledge base composed of heterogeneous representations of the same conceptual en-
tities: that is, the hybrid knowledge base includes prototypes, exemplars and classical
representations for the same concept. Such different bodies of knowledge act like seman-
tic pointers towards the same conceptual entity (Blouw et al., 2015; Eliasmith et al.,
2012; Thagard, 2012).5
4The characterization in terms of “heterogeneous proxytypes” also allows us to deal with the problem of the
“contextual activation” of a given information based on the external stimulus being considered. The general idea
is that, when we categorize a percept, we do not activate the whole network of knowledge related to its assigned
category. Conversely, we only activate the knowledge that is “contextually relevant” in its respect. In other terms,
we only proxyfy the type of representation that minimizes the distance w.r.t. the percept (see (Lieto, 2014) for
further details).
5It is worth-noting, however, that the similarity with the semantic pointer perspective is limited to this point. In
fact, as pointed out in (Lieto, 2014), while (Blouw et al., 2015; Eliasmith et al., 2012; Thagard, 2012) propose a
4
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Both prototypes and exemplars are represented by adopting the conceptual spaces
framework (see Section 3.1), while classical information is represented through standard
symbolic formalisms (i.e., by means of a formal ontology).
From a reasoning perspective, instead, the retrieval of such representations is driven
by different process types. In particular, prototype and exemplar-based retrieval is based
on a fast and approximate kind of categorization, and benefits from defeasible, common-
sense information associated to concepts. On the other hand, the retrieval of classical
representation of concepts is featured by explicit rule following, and makes no use of
defeasible, common-sense information. These two differing categorization strategies have
been widely studied in psychology of reasoning in the frame of the dual process theory,
that postulates the co-existence of two different types of cognitive systems (Evans and
Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). The systems of the first type (type 1 ) are phyloge-
netically older, unconscious, automatic, associative, parallel and fast. The systems of the
second type (type 2 ) are more recent, conscious, sequential and slow, and featured by
explicit rule following. We assume that both systems can be composed in their turn by
many sub-systems and processes. According to the hypotheses in (Frixione and Lieto,
2012, 2014), the conceptual representation of our system includes two main sorts of com-
ponents, based on these two sorts of processes. Type 1 processes have been designed to
deal with prototypes- and exemplar-based retrieval, while Type 2 processes have been
designed to deal with deductive inference.
The two sorts of system processes interact (Algorithm 1), since Type 1 processes are
executed first and their results are then refined by Type 2 processes. In the implemented
system the typical representational and reasoning functions are assigned to the System
1 (hereafter S1), which executes processes of Type 1, and is associated to the conceptual
spaces framework (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000, 2014). On the other hand, the classical represen-
tational and reasoning functions are assigned to the System 2 (hereafter S2) to execute
processes of Type 2, and are associated to a standard Description Logics based ontological
representation.
Figure 1 shows the heterogeneous representation for the concept tiger, with prototyp-
ical and exemplar-based representations semantically pointing to the same conceptual
entity. In this example, the exemplar and prototype-based representations make use of
non classical (or typical) information. Namely, the prototypical representation grasps
information such as that tigers are wild animals, their fur has yellow and black stripes,
etc.; the exemplar-based representations grasp information on individuals. For example,
in Fig. 1 is represented an individual of white-tiger, which is a particular type of tiger
with white fur.6 Both sorts of representations activate Type 1 processes. On the other
hand, the classical body of knowledge is filled with necessary and sufficient information
to characterize the concept (representing, for example, the taxonomic information that
a tiger is a mammal and a carnivore), and activates Type 2 processes. For the sake of
readability the information in Figure 1 is visualized with a uniform format, even though
the different representations are actually encoded in different formalisms.
In the following we introduce the two representational and reasoning frameworks
adopted in our system, by focusing i) on how typicality information (including both
prototypes and exemplars) and their corresponding non-monotonic reasoning procedures
heterogeneity at the level of the information channel (i.e., they consider, as “conceptual components”, the different
information channels through which the content of the information is provided) in our framework the focus is on
the heterogeneity regarding the content of the represented information. In our opinion our axis of representation
provides an additional level of generality, since the content distinction is cross-channel.
6This implies that subclasses can be possibly represented by several exemplars.
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concept Tiger
Knowledge Base
semantic pointers
Kingdom: Animalia
Class: Mammalia
Order: Carnivora
Genus: Panthera
Species: P. tigris
ontological 
representation
classical information
Classical knowledge
is-a: feline
color: yellow
hasPart: fur
hasPart: tail
hasPart: stripes
... 
conceptual space 
representation
white-tiger
is-a: feline
color: white
hasPart: fur
hasPart: tail
hasPart: stripes
... 
prototype of Tiger exemplars of Tiger
Typicality-based knowledge
...
Figure 1.: Heterogeneous representation of the tiger concept in the hybrid knowledge
base.
can be encoded through conceptual spaces; and ii) on how classical information can be
naturally encoded in terms of formal ontologies.
3.1. S1-S2: Conceptual Spaces and Ontologies
Conceptual spaces (CS) are a representational framework where knowledge is repre-
sented as a set of quality dimensions, and where a geometrical structure is associated
to each quality dimension.7 In this setting, concepts correspond to convex regions,
and regions with different geometrical properties correspond to different sorts of con-
cepts (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000). In addition, concepts are characterized in terms of domains;
a domain is “a set of integral dimensions that are separable from all other dimen-
sions” (Ga¨rdenfors, 2014). Typical domain examples are color, size, shape, texture. In
turn, domain information can be specified along some dimensions: e.g., in the case of the
color domain, relevant dimensions are hue, chromaticity, and brightness.
Prototypes are geometrically interpreted in conceptual spaces, in that they correspond
to the geometrical centre of a convex region. This can be thought of as a centroid, that
is the mean position of all the points in all dimensions. This representation also allows
7This framework has been adopted in different applicative contexts; for a recent overview, please refer to (Zenker
and Ga¨rdenfors, 2015).
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us, given a convex region, to associate each point to a certain centrality degree, that can
be interpreted as a measure of its typicality. Instances can be represented as points in a
multidimensional space, and their similarity can be computed as the intervening distance
between each two points, based on some suitable metrics.8 This framework has been
employed also to represent exemplars, that are modelled as points in the multidimensional
space. In general, conceptual spaces can be used to compute the proximity between any
two entities, and between entities and prototypes. In order to compute the distance
between two points p1, p2 we use Euclidean metrics to calculate within-domain distance,
while for dimensions from different domains we use the Manhattan distance metrics,
as suggested in (Adams and Raubal, 2009; Ga¨rdenfors, 2000). The weighted Euclidean
distance distE is computed as follows
distE(p1, p2) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
wi(p1,i − p2,i)2 , (1)
where i varies over the n domain dimensions and wi are dimension weights.
In our implementation of conceptual spaces we represent points as vectors (with as
many dimensions as required by the considered domain), whose components correspond
to the point coordinates, so that a natural metrics to compute the similarity between
them is cosine similarity. In this perspective two vectors with same orientation have a
cosine similarity 1, while two orthogonal vectors have cosine similarity 0. The normalized
version of cosine similarity (cˆs), also accounting for the above weights wi is computed as
cˆs(p1, p2) =
∑n
i=1 wi(p1,i × p2,i)√∑n
i=1 wi(p1,i)
2 ×√∑ni=1 wi(p2,i)2 . (2)
In the metric space we have defined, the distance between an individual and prototypes is
computed with the Manhattan distance metrics. The distance between two concepts can
be computed as the distance between two regions: namely, we can compute the distance
between their prototypes, or the minimal distance between their individuals9, or we can
apply more sophisticated algorithms. Further details about technical issues can be found
in (Ghignone et al., 2013).
Optionally, a context k can be defined as a set of weights, to grade the relative relevance
of the considered dimensions –thus resulting in the following formulas: distE(p1, p2, k)
and cˆs(p1, p2, k) from Eq. 1 and 2, respectively–, and to adapt the computation to a
variety of settings, such as, e.g., default values vs. known values, explicitly asserted values
vs. computed values and/or inherited, etc.. Although it is widely accepted that context
plays a major role in considering similarity issues (both in human judgements and in
computational models), presently our similarity metrics does not involve contextually
8Our prototype-based representations and the corresponding categorization strategy adopt the same rationale
as proposed by Edelman in his “Chorus of Prototypes” hypothesis where the comparison of a stimulus with
a small number of prototypes is obtained via the calculation of proximity scores (e.g., in terms of Euclidean
distance) between the feature vector of the perceived input and the synthetic vector of the prototypical represen-
tations (Edelman, 1995). Beyond what has been proposed by Edelman, however, our conceptual representation
is enriched with the exemplars-based representations (and its corresponding reasoning strategy), as explained in
the following pages. The integration (and harmonization) of both prototypes and exemplars-based representations
and reasoning procedures represents one of the main advancements of our proposal.
9Individuals can be thought of as exemplars, that is elements that belong to the given concept by sharing properties
and their related sets of values.
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weighted dimensions, nor tunable metrics, such as those devised in (Aisbett and Gibbon,
1994). These aspects represent an interesting enhancement that we defer to future work.
However, it is worth noting that linguistic context, also known as discourse context –
which is the focus of the present work– is implicitly accounted for by Dual-PECCS
categorization strategy: in our setting we consider as contextually relevant elements only
those explicitly expressed in the input description. The explicit elements of the discourse
structure are therefore at the base of our notion of context: this implies that we compute
similarity (between the stimulus and the representations in the hybrid knowledge base,
see Figure 1) by considering only dimensions whose values are explicitly expressed in the
linguistic descriptions.
The internal representation format for handling conceptual spaces has been introduced
in (Lieto et al., 2014); we briefly recall it for the sake of self-containedness. Although the
format has been developed by attempting to keep it as general as possible (so to extend
its usage to further domains), the current implementation has been devised based on
specific representational needs described in Section 5. The basic representational struc-
ture processed by the system is named genericDescription; it is actually a super-domain
that hosts information about both physical and non physical features, arranged into nine
further domains, such as size, shape, color, location, feeding, locomotion, hasPart, partOf,
manRelationship.
To give an example of the conceptual spaces representation, let us consider the size do-
main: the size of entities is expressed through the three Euclidean dimensions; the shape
allows expressing that an object has circular, square, spherical, cubic, etc., shape. The
color space maps object’s features onto the three dimensional L?a?b? color space, in the
same spirit as drawn by Ga¨rdenfors in (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000): in particular, in L?a?b? terms
L? (0 ≤ L ≤ 100) is the correlate of lightness, a? (−128 ≤ a ≤ 127) is the chromaticity
axis ranging from green to red, and b? (−128 ≤ b ≤ 127) is the chromaticity axis ranging
from blue to yellow. The location domain indicates the place or the environment where
the object being modeled can be typically found. It actually results from the combination
of five dimensions, and namely: humidity, indicated as a percentage; temperature, ranging
in [−40◦, 50◦]; altitude, ranging in [−11000, 8848]; vegetation, ranging in [0, 100]; time. In
turn, time contains a partitioning of the hours of the day into sunrise (4–6 AM), morning
(6–12 AM), afternoon (12–5 PM), evening (5–10 PM) and night (10 PM–4 AM). The
locomotion domain combines two dimensions: the former dimension is used to account
for the type of movement (1: swim, 2: dig, 3: crawl, 4: walk, 5: run, 6: roll, 7: jump, 8:
fly), and the latter one is used to account for the speed, expressed in km/h (Bejan and
Marden, 2006). The hasPart and partOf domains are used to complement the analogous
ontological properties: in particular, we collected information about the following dimen-
sions: name, number, and partSize, partColor that are intended to specialize the above
illustrated spaces.
A simplified example of the lion prototype information is reported below.
<object name="lion">
<genericPhysicalDescription>
<size name="lion_size">
<x>70</x>
<y>120</y>
<z>200</z>
</size>
<color name="beige">
<l>63</l>
<a>13</a>
<b>32</b>
</color>
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<location name="savanna">
<humidity>50</humidity>
<temperature>40</temperature>
<altitude>100</altitude>
<vegetation>50</vegetation>
</location>
<locomotion name="walk">
<movement>4</movement>
<speed>10</speed>
</locomotion>
<locomotion name="run">
<movement>5</movement>
<speed>40</speed>
</locomotion>
</genericPhysicalDescription>
</object>
On the other hand, the representation of the classical information regarding a given
concept is demanded to classical ontological formalizations. Although relevant efforts
have been made in the Description Logics community to enhance the ontological rep-
resentation and reasoning capacities with the design of formalisms endowing types of
typical representation and non-monotonic inference (Giordano et al., 2013), nonetheless
the problem of representing and reasoning on typicality remains computationally expen-
sive and practically intractable, and therefore of limited interest for concrete applica-
tions (Frixione and Lieto, 2012).10 Formal ontologies, then, provide the characterization
of concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (if these conditions exists:
as mentioned, most common-sense concepts cannot be characterized in these terms).
In our implementation, the ontological representation adopted by the S2 component is
grounded on the OpenCyc ontology, one of the widest ontological resources currently
available containing more than 230, 000 concepts.
3.1.1. On the Entity Mapping in Heterogeneous Resources
A relevant issue we face is aligning knowledge resources based on different sorts of repre-
sentational formalisms. Although many efforts have been recently invested in the ontology
mapping task (Euzenat et al., 2007; Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2013), in the present setting
a different effort is required by knowledge bases that are as diverse as conceptual spaces
and ontologies.
Under an architectural perspective, S1 and S2 rely on knowledge bases encoded in
different ways, which need to be connected and mapped onto a shared and uniform
representation of meaning in order to allow the ACT-R and CLARION layers to op-
erate them. A rather common approach is to provide entities with sense identifiers,
such as WordNet or BabelNet identifiers. WordNet (WN) is a lexical database for the
English language (Miller, 1995). Different from common dictionaries –organizing terms
alphabetically, but possibly scattering senses– it relies on the idea of grouping terms
into synonyms sets (called synsets), that are equipped with short definitions and us-
age examples. Such sets are represented as nodes of a large semantic network, where
the intervening edges represent a number of semantic relations among synset elements
(such as hyponymy, hypernymy, antonymy, meronymy, holonymy). BabelNet is a wide-
coverage multilingual semantic network resulting from the integration of lexicographic
10In this respect, then, our approach is alternative w.r.t. these ones, since its underlying cognitive assumptions
allowed us to practically implement a system, thus avoiding intractability problems which are inherent in the
above mentioned logic-oriented extensions.
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Total Mapped % success
Wikipedia links 19, 876 7, 698 38.7
WordNet 2.1 links 8, 779 5, 197 59.2
total num of classes 27, 823 12, 723 45.7
Table 1.: Summary of the automatic mapping of OpenCyc classes onto WordNet 3.0
synset IDs.
and encyclopedic knowledge from WordNet and Wikipedia (Navigli and Ponzetto, 2010);
it extends the constructive rationale of WN –based on sets of synonyms– through the
structure of Wikipedia composed of redirect pages, disambiguation pages, internal links,
inter-language links, and categorical information. More on the algorithm used to build
BabelNet can be found in (Navigli and Ponzetto, 2012).
Entities represented in the conceptual spaces domains, processed by S1, are provided
with WordNet synset IDs; on the other side, classes in S2 are featured by Cyc IDs.
The linking between such identifiers is presently managed through a mapping table.
It turns out, then, that the mapping process is a crucial one in order to practically
handle the considered resources; a more detailed account on such anchoring aspects is
provided in Section 3.1.2. Our mapping proceeded by considering that about 20% classes
in OpenCyc contain references to external knowledge bases (KBs) such as WordNet 2.1
and Wikipedia. The automatically extracted mappings have been computed by following
the references in OpenCyc towards BabelNet and WordNet, which produced as output
about 13, 000 new associations. Namely, linking information in OpenCyc can be arranged
in two classes:
- Wikipedia Links. A subset of classes in OpenCyc are provided with references to
Wikipedia pages. Such references can be directly mapped onto a BabelSynset (in
turn providing a pointer to the WordNet synset ID); each link from a BabelNet ID
to a WordNet ID has been added to our mapping table. The steps to perform this
kind of mapping were: [OpenCyc Class]→ [BabelSynset ID]→ [WordNet 3.0 ID].
- WordNet 2.1 Links. A subset of classes in OpenCyc contain a link to the online
WordNet 2.1 APIs, whose IDs can be directly converted into WN 3.0 IDs through
the SenseMap library.11 The synset name has then been converted into a numeric
ID through the online WordNet 3.0 APIs, and added to the mapping table. The
steps to perform this kind of mapping were: [OpenCyc Class] → [WordNet 2.1
SynsetName] → [WordNet 3.0 SynsetName] → [WordNet 3.0 ID].
Table 1 illustrates some figures about the mapping of Wikipedia links and WordNet
links, by showing how many links were found in OpenCyc, and how many of them could
be mapped onto WN synset IDs. We observed that i) sometimes Cyc classes are linked
to several WN synsets; and ii) in some cases such links are not precise, mostly due to
the differing granularity of the information contained in the KB involved in the mapping
process.
At the current stage of development, although the entities described through the con-
ceptual spaces used by S1 module require being substantially enriched, the mapping
procedure allows handling some 13K descriptions.
11https://goo.gl/lRZYnW.
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3.1.2. On Mapping Conceptual Spaces and Ontological Representations
As above mentioned, an important aspect related to the proposed artificial architecture
for conceptual systems regards the way in which the different kinds of representations
(i.e., the symbolic structures of the ontological representation and the corresponding
underlying conceptual space representations) are mapped one to another. We dealt with
this problem by anchoring both the representations at the level of the general concept
enveloping them. The heterogeneous proxytypes approach, in fact, requires the existence
of co-referring representational structures where the different bodies of knowledge are
assumed to semantically point to the main reference conceptual container (see Figure 1).
In our approach such a container has been automatically provided with a WordNet
synset identifier. In addition, also the corresponding pointing representations (conveying
the different types of conceptual knowledge) have been equipped with the same WordNet
synset ID.
The anchoring mechanism between the representations follows two different ways. The
first one corresponds to the mapping between the general concept and its related on-
tological component (S2 mapping). This mapping is already provided in the OpenCyc
ontology, which is sometimes equipped with the information regarding the correspond-
ing WordNet synset ID. On the other hand, the anchoring between the conceptual space
representations and the corresponding general concept (S1 mapping) is obtained as fol-
lows: the linguistic elements extracted through an Information Extraction step (please
refer to Section 3.2) are automatically equipped with the corresponding WordNet synset
ID, if any. After this process, Dual-PECCS inspects the Conceptual Spaces Knowl-
edge Base searching for the elements corresponding to the extracted linguistic entities.
This process is presently based on a simple string-matching between the names of the
extracted linguistic entities and the names of the concepts available in the Conceptual
Spaces. Once this mapping is provided, the WordNet synset ID assigned to the extracted
linguistic entities is transferred to the corresponding representation in the Conceptual
Spaces. Finally, the ID obtained in Conceptual Spaces is linked to the WN synset ID
already associated to the general concept.
Interestingly, this approach could be easily extended to visual categorization systems
by adding, to the whole networks of heterogeneous representations, the ImageNet iden-
tifiers (Deng et al., 2009). In the context of artificial vision and robotic applications
there are proposals similar to our approach. In particular, the works in (Chella et al.,
1997, 2003) also provides a mapping between different levels of representations, includ-
ing conceptual spaces and symbolic representations. In this case, anchoring is performed
for static and dynamic visual scenes. In particular, in the case of dynamic scenes it is
based on an anchoring function defined from time t to couple assertions (formulas for
the Situation Calculus) and Conceptual Space structures by using look-up tables. The
main similarity with their approach by (Chella et al., 1997) is that also our model is
primarily focused on the representational issue of the anchoring problem, and does not
consider the procedural one (on these aspects, please refer to (Coradeschi and Saffiotti,
2000)). Conversely, the main difference w.r.t. their approach is that we adopt externally
developed and well known resources for providing the linguistic anchoring (such as Word-
net). This allows our system a good level of compatibility and interoperability with other
language technologies adopting the same resources. In the next sections we present the
details regarding the categorization strategies adopted in the Dual-PECCS.
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Data: Linguistic description d
Result: A class assignment, as computed by S1 and S2
1 trialCounter← 0;
2 closedS1 = {∅}
3 while trialCounter < maxTrials do
// conceptual spaces output
4 c← S1(d, closedS1);
5 if trialCounter == 0 then c∗ ← c ;
// ontology based consistency check
6 cc← S2(d, conceptPointedBy(c));
7 if cc equals(conceptPointedBy(c)) then
8 return 〈c∗, cc〉;
9 else
10 closedS1 add(conceptPointedBy(c))
11 end
12 ++trialCounter ;
13 end
14 cc← S2(〈d,Thing〉);
15 return 〈c∗, cc〉;
Algorithm 1: The S1-S2 categorization process.
3.2. Categorization Pipeline of the Dual-PECCS
The whole categorization pipeline implemented by Dual-PECCS works as follows. The
input to the system is a simple linguistic description, like ‘The animal that eats bananas’,
and the expected output is a given category evoked by the description (e.g., the category
monkey in this case). After an Information Extraction (IE) step, the input information
is encoded into an internal format devised to store conceptual spaces information, which
is then used as input in the categorization task by adopting the strategies that will be
described below.
A shallow IE approach has been devised, where the morphological information com-
puted from input sentences has been used to devise a simple finite-state automaton
describing the input sentences’ structure (more on the input descriptions in Section 5).
This approach would not scale to handle more complex sentences; its limitations are due
to using morphological information, and in general are inherent in finite-state machines
(which prevents us from dealing with parenthetical clauses, like relative clauses). We
defer to future work the adoption of richer language models. Despite these limitations,
however, it allowed us to complete the automatization of the software pipeline going all
throughout from the simple linguistic input description used for the evaluation (that will
be described later) to its final conceptual categorization.
3.3. Dual Process Categorization
The overall control strategy implemented by Dual-PECCS governs the flow of inter-
action between the S1 and S2 systems (it is thus referred to as S1-S2 categorization).
Its underlying rationale is to assess the approximate categorization results obtained by
Type 1 processes in S1 with the ontological information and the deliberative processes of
reasoning implemented by S2. The S1-S2 categorization process can be summarized as
follows (Algorithm 1). The system takes in input a textual description d and produces in
12
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Data: Linguistic description: d; list of inconsistent concepts: closedS1.
Result: A typicality based representation of a category.
1 S1ex← categorizeExemplars(d);
2 if firstOf(S1ex, closedS1).distance(d) < similarityThreshold then
3 return firstOf (S1ex, closedS1);
4 else
5 S1pr← categorizePrototypes(d);
// in case of equal distance prefer exemplars
6 typicalityCategorization ← sortResults(S1ex, S1pr);
7 return firstOf (typicalityCategorization, closedS1);
8 end
Algorithm 2: S1 categorization with prototypes and exemplars implementing the in-
struction in Algorithm 1: line 4.
output a pair 〈c∗, cc〉, the output of S1 and S2, respectively. If the categorization result
provided by S1 (based on the similarity calculation between the input and S1 repre-
sentations) is consistent with the ontology, then the categorization succeeded and the
category provided by S2 (cc) is returned along with c∗, the top scoring class returned
by S1. Otherwise the system evaluates a fixed amount (maxTrials) of S1 candidates,
meantime keeping track of the inconsistent elements that are added to the closedS1 list.
In case all the S1 candidates are inconsistent w.r.t. the ontology in S2, the output of
S2, computed independently of S1, is provided along with c∗. The control strategy im-
plements a tradeoff between ontological inference and the output of S1, which is more
informative but also formally less reliable.12
The S1 categorization algorithm implements the instruction in Algorithm 1, line 4
by determining which kind of S1 output must be selected and then checked against
the deliberative S2 module (Algorithm 2). In particular, the algorithm is designed to
activate either the prototypical-based or the exemplar-based representation, according
to the actual input description. The implemented procedure works as follows: when
the input stimulus –in our case a simple linguistic description– is similar enough to an
exemplar representation (a threshold has been fixed to these ends), the corresponding
exemplar of a given category is retrieved. Otherwise, the prototypical representations
are also scanned and the representation (prototype or exemplar) that is closest to the
input is returned. By following a preference that has been experimentally observed in
human cognition (Medin and Schaffer, 1978), this algorithm favors the results of the
exemplars-based categorization if the knowledge-base stores any exemplars similar to
the input being categorized.
4. Integrating Dual-PECCS into ACT-R and CLARION
The proposed system has been integrated into two of the most widely known cognitive
architectures: ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004) and CLARION (Sun, 2006). The under-
lying rationale behind such integration efforts is to investigate whether our approach is
12For example, given an input description such as “The very big fish that eats plankton”, the S1 component
returns an approximate output that is whale, which is then discarded by the S2 ontological reasoning process
since whales are mammals and not fishes. The second item returned by S1 is whale-shark, which is successfully
checked against the ontological knowledge base. Dual-PECCS then returns both whale (the top-scoring class
according to S1) and whale-shark (the second result of S1 also consistent with the ontology).
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compatible with architectures implementing different cognitive theories of mind; in this
case, it can be considered a candidate general framework for representing and reasoning
on conceptual information, and eventually tested with even further architectures.
One main difference between the two architectures is that CLARION natively assumes
the perspective of the dual process theory; ACT-R, on the other hand, is not natively
dual process based. Therefore, in the latter architecture, the dual mechanisms of rea-
soning need to be explicitly designed and implemented instantiated within an already
existing general framework. In particular, in ACT-R cognitive mechanisms emerge from
the interaction of two types of knowledge: the declarative knowledge, that encodes ex-
plicit facts that the system knows, and the procedural knowledge, that encodes rules for
processing declarative knowledge. The declarative module is used to store and retrieve
pieces of information called chunks, that are featured by a type and a set of attribute-
value pairs, similar to frame slots. Finally, the central production system connects these
modules by using a set of IF-THEN production rules.
Differently, in CLARION, cognitive processes are mainly subject to the activity of
two sub-systems, called Action Centered Sub-system (ACS) and the Non-Action Cen-
tered Sub-system (NACS). Both sub-systems store information using a two-layered ar-
chitecture, i.e., they both include an explicit and an implicit level of representation.
The working memory, acting as temporary storage for decision making, is a part of the
ACS, which also maintains the active behavior strategies. To hold general knowledge, the
NACS provides a semantic memory consisting of both a rule-based layer that encodes
explicit, symbolic knowledge, and of an underlying distributed layer with implicit, sub-
symbolic representations. A rule in CLARION connects a condition, encoded as a chunk,
with an action, encoded as another chunk. For both architectures we mainly focused
on the Declarative Memory and Working Memory, and on the corresponding retrieval
mechanisms (Figure 2).
Besides, the dual process strategies of concept categorization have been integrated into
the ACT-R and CLARION processes and connected to the retrieval request executed in
the Working Memory. More in detail: in the Extended Declarative Memory (equivalent
to its counterpart, NACS, in CLARION) every concept is represented as an empty chunk
(that is, a chunk having no associated information, except for its WordNet synset ID and
a human readable name), referred to by the external bodies of knowledge (prototypes
and exemplars) acting like semantic pointers. The novel dual process-based categorization
mechanism triggers both the S1 categorization and the S1-S2 categorization procedures.
In this setting, when the categorization result of S1 is returned, the representation acti-
vated in the Extended Declarative Long-Term Memory is proxyfied (i.e., recalled to the
working memory, see Algorithm 1, line 4) in order to perform the S2 consistency check
(Algorithm 1, line 6), in the dual process perspective.
As regards as the ACT-R implementation, we have integrated our hybrid knowledge
base directly into the declarative memory, differently from other approaches that have
extended the knowledge capabilities of ACT-R based on the introduction of a new, ad-hoc,
external module of declarative memory (Oltramari and Lebiere, 2012; Salvucci, 2014).
We designed a novel retrieval request implementing the S1-S2 categorization mechanism
by extending the repertoire of the retrieval buffer through a new action (symbolized
by the operator $). Such action allows a direct access to the heterogeneous information
represented by the S1-S2 external bodies of knowledge.13 We designed two types of $
13The standard symbols already existing in ACT-R for the retrieval buffer are: ‘+’ for standard chunk requests
to the declarative memory module, ‘=’ for chunk modification and testing, and ‘?’ for buffer and module status
checking. The standard ACT-R retrieval is featured by basically testing the equality of slot values (with the
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(e.g. indicating whether or not outcomes are satisfactory). The role of the
meta-cognitive subsystem is to monitor, direct, and modify the operations of the
action-centred subsystem dynamically as well as the operations of all the other
subsystems.
Each of these interacting subsystems consists of two levels of representation
(i.e. a dual representational structure). Generally, in each subsystem, the top level
encodes explicit knowledge and the bottom level encodes implicit knowledge.
The distinction between implicit and explicit has been amply discussed elsewhere
(Reber 1989, Stanley et al. 1989, Seger 1994, Cleeremans et al. 1998, Sun 2002).
The two levels interact, for example, by cooperating in actions through
a combination of the action recommendations from the two levels respectively,
as well as by cooperating in learning through a bottom-up and a top-down process
(to be discussed below). Essentially, it is a dual-process theory of mind (Chaiken and
Trope 1999); see figure 2.
It has been intended that this cognitive architecture satisfies some basic require-
ments as follows. It should be able to learn with or without a priori domain-specific
knowledge to begin with (Reber 1989, Sun et al. 2001). It also has to learn
continuously from on-going experience in the world. As indicated by Medin et al.
(1987), Nosofsky et al. (1994), and others, human learning is often gradual and
ongoing. As suggested by Reber (1989), Seger (1994), Anderson (1983), and others,
there are clearly different types of knowledge involved in human learning
(e.g. procedural versus declarative, implicit versus explicit, or subconceptual versus
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requests that ar exec ted according to the specific type of request received from the
exception of some slots –that need to be explicitly indicated by th programmer– for which it is possible to
exploit values similarity); conversely, our approach implements a similarity-based retrieval over all the considered
dimensions, which is aimed at providing as result the element minimizing the distance from the input query.
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retrieval buffer: the approximate categorization request and the consistency request. The
approximate categorization request is activated when the retrieval request is generic: i.e.,
the request chunk lacks of the concept type (the concept id slot set to nil), that in this
kind of request needs to be retrieved. This task is similar to the open request that is
possible to execute in ACT-R (Thomson et al., 2014), like in the following example.
$retrieval>
concept_id nil
family_1_name felin
haspart_1_name fur
haspart_1_color_1_name yellow
haspart_1_color_1_l 80.0
haspart_1_color_1_a -20.0
haspart_1_color_1_b 94.0
haspart_2_name stripe
haspart_2_color_1_name black
haspart_2_color_1_l 0.0
haspart_2_color_1_a 0.0
haspart_2_color_1_b 0.0
[...]
This kind of request triggers the S1 retrieval system, and its output is a chunk-like trans-
lation of the exemplar or the prototype resulting from the execution of the S1 retrieval
on the typicality-based knowledge. We used the conceptual finsts, by building on the
notion of declarative finsts (Pylyshyn, 1989) delivered in ACT-R, to keep track of the
representations that have been recently retrieved by the system S1. In our implemen-
tation, conceptual finsts allow S1 to exclude the elements already inspected and found
inconsistent, by adding them to the closedS1 list. On the other hand, if the $ request
specifies the concept to which it refers (i.e., the $ request chunk contains a filler for the
concept id slot), then we are dealing with a consistency check request, to be sent to the
S2 system: in this case, we convert the request and redirect it to the S2 system that
checks whether the features of the chunk are compatible with the proposed classifica-
tion. The output of this request is a chunk where the slot concept id is filled with the
conceptual representation resulting from S2.
The integration at the representational and reasoning level in CLARION followed the
same rationale indicated in ACT-R, but has been adapted to the specific requirements
of the architecture. In particular, we adopted both implicit and explicit representational
layers provided by the NACS in order to create a direct mapping with our hybrid archi-
tecture: S1 (and its typicality-based information represented with conceptual spaces) has
been mapped onto the implicit layer, while S2 (the classical, ontology-based representa-
tion), has been mapped onto the explicit one. The mapping between the sub-symbolic
module of CLARION and the dimension-based representations of the conceptual spaces
has been favored since such architecture also synthesizes the implicit information in terms
of dimensions-values slots. The dual process based categorization mechanisms have been
implemented based on the following procedure: every request is encoded in working mem-
ory as a particular type of instance (instance chunk). The dimensions and values of every
instance chunk are filled through an update of the implicit module with the information
extracted from the external stimulus (in the present case a linguistic description). After
building the chunk request, a retrieval request is executed on the S1 knowledge base
with the aim at retrieving an exemplar or a prototype-based representation. Such result
is stored in working memory, and checked, as previously illustrated, with the knowledge
of the external S2 knowledge base (the Cyc ontology in our case). More specifically, the
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categorization process starts in CLARION when an instance chunk is built and added
to the working memory; such process is executed in the ACS module, and it is arranged
as a series of rounds, each producing a query to the implicit S1 component and to the
explicit S2 module. The ACS module initializes the input layer of the S1 module, based
on the instance chunk being considered. This initialization requires to handle external
stimuli (the world) along with internal information, at disposal of CLARION agents. Let
us start from the sensory input space: this space represents the agent’s percepts, and
is encoded as a set of pairs 〈dimension,value〉. Populating the sensory input space (and
therefore building the instance chunk for the request to be sent to the NACS declarative
memory) involves adding the appropriate set of 〈dimension,value〉 pairs (when such in-
formation, extracted from the input stimuli, is available). Filling a value of a dimension in
CLARION is based on the sub-symbolic activation of that dimension when the external
input is processed.
In our implementation the available dimensions that a chunk can assume is based on
the set of dimensions defined in (Lieto et al., 2015b) for the encoding of conceptual
spaces (therefore the internal information that CLARION can process is fixed). It is
worth nothing that the activated chunk can lack of some information (i.e., a dimension
not filled with its corresponding value), since by definition percepts include noisy or
partially missing information.
When the instance chunk is formed a request to the implicit S1 component is called.
The output will be either a chunk representing a prototype or an exemplar representa-
tion, corresponding to the prototype/exemplar returned by S1. Such intermediate result
is then added to the working memory for the consistency check, which is performed by
the explicit module. In turn, the explicit module tests the consistency of the instance
chunk recently added to the Working Memory: if the instance chunk is consistent with
the ontological knowledge base, then the explicit module returns the concept chunk cor-
responding to the output of S1, thus implementing the notion of proxyfication; otherwise,
a special chunk is returned to indicate that an inconsistency was detected. In this case
the explicit module evaluates the next result returned by the implicit module, and the
whole S1-S2 process is iterated until a representation consistent with the KB is found
(as illustrated in Algorithm 1: line 3), or by exiting with a failure in case the maximal
number of rounds is reached (Algorithm 1: line 14).
In the next sections we present and discuss some results obtained by the system.
5. Evaluation
A dataset composed of 112 descriptions (corresponding to very simple riddles), was col-
lected and given in input to the implemented system: namely, we selected 56 descriptions
for which an exemplar-based representation was expected to be retrieved, and 56 de-
scriptions for which a prototype-based representation was expected to be retrieved. This
experimentation extends a previous one, presented in (Lieto et al., 2015c). These stimuli
have been built by a multidisciplinary team composed of neuropsychologists, linguists and
philosophers in the frame of a project aimed at investigating the brain activation of visual
areas in tasks of lexical processing even for very abstract concepts. An example of such
descriptions is “The big carnivore with yellow fur and black stripes”, where the expected
category to be retrieved was tiger, and in particular its representation corresponding to
the “prototype of tiger”; conversely, a description such as “The big carnivore with white
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fur and black stripes” was expected to lead as answer to “exemplar of white tiger”.14
The expected categorical targets represent a gold standard, since they correspond to the
results provided by human subjects in a twofold psychological experimentation. In the
first experiment, 30 healthy volunteers (16 females and 14 males) were recruited for the
experiment from the Computer Science and Psychology Departments of the University of
Turin. Participants were all na¨ıve to the experimental procedure and to the aims of the
study. Participants were asked to perform an inferential task “Naming from definition”:
the subjects were presented the stimuli and asked to overtly name, as accurately and as
fast as possible, the target concept corresponding to the definition, using a microphone
connected to a response box. The stimuli were presented through the E-Prime software,
which was also used to record data on accuracy and reaction times; a richer account of
this experimentation is provided in (Radicioni et al., 2015). An additional experimen-
tation has been run on a dataset also including exemplar-based representations along
with prototype-based representations. In this case, 10 subjects (4 females and 6 males)
were recruited among PhD students and Postdoc fellows from the Computer Science De-
partment of the University of Turin. As for the previous experiment, participants were
all na¨ıve to the experimental procedure and to the aims of the study. The experimen-
tal design was borrowed from the third experiment described in (Malt, 1989): subjects
underwent a training phase where exemplar information was also explicitly taught. For
example, for the concept tiger they were presented an exemplar of siberian tiger, an ex-
emplar of malaysian tiger and a prototypical tiger. After the training phase they were
asked to perform the same inferential task “Naming from definition”, by naming not only
the target concept corresponding to the definition, but also the specific representation
(either exemplar or prototype) activated by the linguistic definition.
In both experimentations the recorded answers were consistent with our assumptions
and more in general with the literature concerning prototypes and exemplar-based re-
trieval, which allows us to consider the target concepts like the expected categories, and
the target representations as expected proxyfied representations.
To assess the Dual-PECCS system we have considered a twofold experimental setting.
In the first case we tested the whole pipeline, where the salient information is extracted
by starting from the linguistic description, the corresponding representation is retrieved,
proxyfied and loaded in working memory according to the dual process approach. The
information extraction of the linguistic input is not implemented in ACT-R, but it relies
on the CoreNLP Stanford Parser (Manning et al., 2014), which is used to convert the
textual description into a chunk request. This measure is intended to assess the robustness
of the overall approach, from the input parsing to the final categorization. In the second
case we tested the heterogeneous proxytypes approach by directly starting with a manual
encoding of the linguistic stimulus in terms of chunk request: this measure is intended
to assess the accuracy in the categorization task of the hybrid system, featured by dual
process approach, heterogeneous representation and reasoning, proxyfication, integration
in the ACT-R architecture, but no information extraction.
In both cases (all linguistic pipeline vs. ‘clean’ input) we recorded two distinct metrics:
i) Concept-categorization accuracy (CC-acc metrics) This metrics was designed to eval-
uate the final categorization, that is the accuracy in retrieving the expected concept (in
this case, the wrong proxyfication did not count as error).
ii) Proxyfication accuracy (P-accmetrics) This metrics was designed to evaluate whether
14 A prototype of the system is available at the URL https://goo.gl/cyThwa together with the example files
containing the full list of descriptions employed in the experimentation. A stable version of the system is available
at http://www.dualpeccs.di.unito.it/
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Table 2.: The accuracy results (Table 2-a) and the analysis of the proxyfication errors
(Table 2-b).
a. Accuracy rates obtained for the conceptual categorization accuracy (CC-acc) and proxyfica-
tion accuracy (P-acc) metrics.
test CC-acc P-acc
with no IE 89.3% (100/112) 79.0% (79/100)
with IE 77.7% (87/112) 71.3% (62/87)
b. Analysis of the errors in the proxyfication (P-acc metrics).
test
Proxyfication error
Ex-Proto Proto-Ex Ex-Ex
with no IE 21.0% (21/100) 0.0% (0/100) 0.0% (0/100)
with IE 28.8% (26/87) 0.0% (0/87) 5.8% (5/87)
given in input a description evoking a given concept, the expected proxyfied represen-
tation was retrieved. In this case the confusion between prototype and exemplar (or
between exemplars) is scored as error even if the expected category is returned.
5.1. Results and Discussion
The system obtained an accuracy of 89.3% in conceptual retrieval (that reduces to 77.7%
when performing the IE step), and 79% in the proxyfication task (71.3% in the setting
with the IE). These figures are reported in Table 2.
The results in the conceptual categorization are in line with those previously reported
in (Lieto et al., 2015a), although the dataset was presently more diverse by including
exemplars, as well. The results of the whole pipeline (Table 2-a, second row) provide a
baseline for future implementations of the IE step; we observe that, although producing
11.6% error either in the POS tagging or in the IE step proper, this result is also in line
with those reported in (Lieto et al., 2015b). This fact shows that the approach –devised to
match the simple linguistic structures in the considered stimuli, and which was expected
not to generalize to handle further linguistic descriptions– maintains its performance
when dealing with a broader dataset. The IE step significantly affects also the P-acc
metrics: that is, if we restrict to considering cases where the concept was categorized
as expected, the proxyfication step is performed correctly in 79.0% of descriptions with
‘clean’ input, and only in 71.3% of cases with the Information Extraction step.
Table 2-b reports the detailed errors committed in the proxyfication phase; here we dis-
tinguish three cases. Provided that proxyfication errors occur only when the concept has
been correctly categorized, three kinds of proxyfication errors were recorded: an exemplar
returned in place of an expected prototype (column Ex-Proto); a prototype returned in
place of an expected exemplar (column Proto-Ex), or by retrieving a wrong exemplar
(e.g., an individual of siberian tiger in place of an individual of malaysian tiger, column
Ex-Ex). Notably, the vast majority of errors are due to confusion between exemplars and
prototypes: in particular, in the 21% of the considered stimuli an exemplar-proxyfied rep-
resentation has been returned by the system in spite of the expected prototype. This sort
of error raises to 28.8% in the implementation including the IE task. This error was caused
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by the fact that in case exemplar based representations in the KB are equipped with the
typical information matching the linguistic description being categorized, then such rep-
resentations are always favored w.r.t. their prototypical counterpart (see Section 3.1, Al-
gorithm 2). However this fact, although in line with psychological experimental evidence
where exemplars –if available– are mostly returned as first choice, is counterintuitive for
very general descriptions situated at a high level of abstraction. For example, given the
input description “The animal that eats bananas”, the Dual-PECCS retrieves the rep-
resentation of the exemplar associated to roloway monkey, while the expected output,
based on the answers provided by human subjects, is a generic prototype of monkey
since the provided description is quite general. This particular class of errors deserves
additional clarification in future works: albeit emerged experimenting the computational
model, it also suggests that additional analysis is needed in the theoretical debate about
exemplars and prototypes. Our results seem to demand deepening the heuristics that
steer our categorical choices when the stimulus at hand spans different levels of abstrac-
tion. Therefore also from an epistemological perspective this result is interesting, since
it shows how cognitively-inspired computational models of cognition taking into account
a structuralist perspective, can fruitfully provide insights to the theoretical counterparts
that they implement, in a continuous cycle of interaction between theoretical and ex-
perimental settings (see e.g. (Lieto and Radicioni, 2016) for the distinction between
structuralist and functionalist artificial models of cognition).
The rest of errors are less relevant, except for the type Ex-Ex, where we observe a
5.8% error rate, which is mostly due to the noisy features extracted from the linguistic
descriptions.
6. Conclusions
This article has illustrated two main advancements, in that Dual-PECCS provides the
heterogeneous proxyfication approach –governed by the dual process theory– with a work-
ing implementation; the resulting system is able to autonomously perform prototypical
and exemplar-based categorization. Additionally, it has been integrated into ACT-R and
CLARION, thus showing a good level of compatibility with two general cognitive systems
making different theoretical assumptions about the architecture of human cognition. Al-
though there is room for both refining the theory and tuning the implemented system,
the obtained experimental results are encouraging. Our proposal, in addition, seems to
suggest, in perspective, a suitable way to deal with both the size and the heterogeneity
problems affecting the knowledge level in cognitive architectures (Lieto, 2015).
As mentioned, an aspect that emerged from the experimentation deserves further inves-
tigation: namely, it regards the phenomenon of the proxyfication errors15 of exemplar-
based representations, even for stimuli representing quite general typical descriptions.
Such descriptions, in fact, determine in humans the activation of prototypes.
As a future work, we plan to extend the current integrated S1-S2 knowledge base
(in particular the S1 component) by recurring to both semi-automatic enrichment of
conceptual spaces through the use of existing resources such as ConceptNet (Liu and
Singh, 2004), as well as to manual annotation by exploiting also crowdsourcing and
gamification systems.
15We remark that we considered as errors results differing from the answers provided by the human subjects
interviewed.
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Additionally, as a mid term goal, we plan to integrate the proposed representational
and reasoning framework into further general cognitive architectures (e.g., SOAR, LIDA,
OpenCog etc.). Such set of integrations, should it prove to be feasible, would show
whether the proposed representational and reasoning system may be used as a reference
framework for different cognitive architectures. Moreover, it will allow us to simulate
brain disorders related to the activation and retrieval of conceptual information by di-
rectly building on processes and patterns proper to each architecture. Some disorders
can be thought of as involving the access to conceptual structures that may inhibit, in
different ways, the “proxyfication” process of the different representational elements of
our hybrid framework. A particularly interesting disorder, to our present concerns, re-
gards the impairment known as Semantic Dementia, selectively involving the capability
of the “proxyfication” of the S1 representations and not the subsequent S2 access and
control check.
Finally, further representational levels and sources can be foreseen that fit the needs
of cognitive architectures, e.g., dealing with sensory-motor representations, visual rep-
resentations and imagery, etc.. Relatedly, it should be possible to extend the proposed
framework to integrate such additional levels into the Dual-PECCS: for example, af-
fordances can be thought of as prototypical sensory-motor representations associated to
a given concept. We plan, as a long-term goal, to provide a comprehensive account of
such aspects in our system.
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